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THE STATUS QUO BIAS AND
COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION
GREGORY S. MCNEAL *
I. INTRODUCTION
Counterterrorism detention policy in the United States is a mess.
Commentators on both sides of the political spectrum have decried the U.S.
approach. Those on the left have criticized the arbitrary and unfair nature
of U.S. policy; 1 they argue that detention policy has unfairly trampled on
the rights of individuals, producing results that are inconsistent and,
perhaps, counterproductive, especially in the eyes of U.S. allies and the
Muslim world. Others have approached this question from a security
perspective, decrying the granting of privileges to those who fail to follow
the rules of civilized nations yet then demand the protection of those
nation’s rules upon capture. 2 Those critics argue that our detention policies
have unnecessarily endangered American security and must be toughened.
Regardless of which argument is correct, both sides seem to agree that the
status quo is untenable. In light of the critiques, what accounts for the lack
of reform? One way of understanding the dysfunction inherent in detention
policy is by seeing detention policy as a fixed policy domain mired in the
status quo.
Policy advocates have created an information-induced
equilibrium where the costs of reform exceed the benefits of the status quo.
The status quo is characterized by (1) a hyper-political discourse about
counterterrorism detention policy that has led to (2) the elevation of politics
over policy and (3) questions about the legitimacy of counterterrorism
detention. When these factors are coupled with uncertainty about what
*

Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. With sincere
thanks to the Symposium Editors at Northwestern, especially Charles Devore and Jonathan
Sabo.
1
See generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS
LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy Combatant” Cases
in Historical Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1005, 1006–07 (2007) (citing other prominent critics such as Bruce Ackerman, Neal
Katyal, and Harold Koh).
2
JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AFTER 9/11 (2005); see also Pushaw, supra note 1.
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change might entail, the status quo becomes a powerful force, characterized
by a lack of focused attention to issues, and an inability to justify change.
In this Article, I will first analyze the policy discourse surrounding
detention policy. Next, I will describe the current state of affairs in
detention policy, describing the uncertainty in the system and the calls for
reform. Finally, I will make the case for pessimism, arguing that reform is
unlikely due to the polarized nature of the counterterrorism detention policy
debate and the strength of the status quo.
II. BETWEEN POLICY DISCOURSE AND PARTISAN ARGUMENTS
A. STATUS QUO INDUCING ARGUMENTS ABOUT COUNTERTERRORISM
DETENTION

To understand the status quo in counterterrorism detention, one must
first understand the hyper-political discourse that surrounds
counterterrorism detention policies. This discourse will be a substantial
challenge for advocates looking to reform the current system. It is
instructive to consider some of the ways in which interest groups have sown
doubt about the merits and costs of counterterrorism detention; this subpart
will summarize some of the most common critiques of counterterrorism
detention.
One frequently used tactic used by critics of preventive detention was
to delegitimize detention facilities such as Guantanamo, by depicting them
as cage prisons. 3 In fact, human rights groups used the photos of “cages”
used in Guantanamo as a tool to describe the Guantanamo detention facility
as an inhumane place to detain people. I say the photos were used as a tool
because those photos depicted temporary facilities that were closed shortly
after the Guantanamo detention facility was opened. Donald Rumsfeld,
during his tenure as Secretary of Defense noted that Camp X-Ray (the
facility frequently featured in the cage critiques) was overgrown with sixfoot-tall weeds, yet the imagery persisted, as did the myth of Guantanamo
as a facility where men were caged as animals. 4 With that said, the hyper3

See, e.g., ANDY WORTHINGTON, THE GUANTANAMO FILES: THE STORIES OF THE 774
DETAINEES
IN
AMERICA'S
ILLEGAL
PRISON
(2007);
CAGE
PRISONERS,
http://www.cageprisoners.com/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); cf. Jan Crawford Greenburg,
Closing Gitmo May Be Just the Beginning, ABC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2008),
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/President44/story?id=6461062&page=1 (explaining how
Guantanamo began as an open air facility and is now a modern prison and Camp X-Ray is
now overgrown with weeds).
4
See Morris Davis, In Defense of Guantanamo Bay, 117 YALE L.J. Pocket Part 2 (2007)
(“Overgrown with weeds, Camp X-Ray was only inhabited by banana rats and iguanas when
I first saw it in January 2006. Nonetheless, to this day news stories about Guantanamo Bay
frequently contain pictures of detainees in Camp X-Ray, even though it was abandoned more
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political discourse surrounding detention policy is not limited to rights
groups; Secretary Rumsfeld was just as guilty of committing this offense
when he described the detainees in Guantanamo as the worst of the worst,
an assertion that has been largely disproven. 5
Another frequent assertion made by advocates and scholars, without
any real factual support is that Guantanamo and other detention facilities
are a recruiting tool for al Qaeda.6 This assertion is a key element in the
campaign to delegitimize and sow doubt about the status quo. This is
presumably part of an effort to undermine the chances that the status quo
becomes a permanent legislatively fixed policy option (as opposed to its
current ad hoc form which may eventually fall into desuetude). The
assertions by legal scholars making these claims fall into three categories:
(1) legal scholars that claim that general civil liberties violations (including
the use of preventive detention) committed in counterterrorism operations
implicitly aid terrorist recruitment; (2) legal scholars that specifically argue
that Guantanamo functions as a recruiting tool for al Qaeda; and (3) legal
scholars that only allude to the fact, but do not argue that counterterrorism
detention serves as a recruiting tool.

than five years ago.”). Davis wrote his article in 2007, five years after Camp X-Ray was
closed. Camp X-Ray was closed in April of 2002. See JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO,
TIMELINE
(2011),
available
at
www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/index/Fact Sheets/
TIMELINE.pdf.
5
KAREN J. GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST P LACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100 DAYS 41–
42 (2010); see also BENJAMIN WITTES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, DETENTION AND DENIAL:
THE CASE FOR CANDOR AFTER GUANTANAMO 8 (2011) see also Katharine Q. Seelye, The
Detainees; Some Guantánamo Prisoners Will Be Freed, Rumsfeld Says, NY TIMES, Oct. 23,
2002, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/23/world/threats-responsesdetainees-some guantanamo-prisoners-will-be-freed-rumsfeld.html.
6
See Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433,
451 n.85 (2010) (citing BARACK OBAMA CAMPAIGN 2008, THE WAR WE NEED TO WIN):
Guantánamo has become a recruiting tool for our enemies. The legal framework behind
Guantánamo has failed completely, resulting in only one conviction. President Bush’s own
Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, wants to close it. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell,
wants to close it. The first step to reclaiming America’s standing in the world has to be closing
this facility. As president, Barack Obama will close the detention facility at Guantánamo. He
will reject the Military Commissions Act, which allowed the U.S. to circumvent Geneva
Conventions in the handling of detainees. He will develop a fair and thorough process based on
the Uniform Code of Military Justice to distinguish between those prisoners who should be
prosecuted for their crimes, those who can’t be prosecuted but who can be held in a manner
consistent with the laws of war, and those who should be released or transferred to their home
countries.

See also Melissa Epstein Mills, Brass-Collar Crime: A Corporate Model for Command
Responsibility, 47 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 25, 26 (2010) (“The reports and pictorial evidence
graphically documenting abuses by American troops against Muslim detainees were the best
recruiting tool our enemies could have hoped for.”).
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First, those who claim but decline to directly state that
counterterrorism detention serves as a recruiting tool argue that general
violations of civil liberties, similar to what they assert happened in
Guantanamo (e.g., torture during preventive detention), can lead to terrorist
recruitment. Those that make this claim say: (1) “torture produces more
terrorists” because terrorist recruitment thrives on America’s abandonment
of human rights values; 7 (2) history shows that “Arab/Muslim prisons,
particularly their torture chambers have served as incubators for generations
of jihadis”; 8 (3) and al Qaeda recruits by playing on the image of an
underdog or “demonizing enemy states as forceful”; 9 and (4) the photos of
the human rights abuses of Abu Ghraib 10 likely spurred otherwise neutral
individuals to feel motivated to “lead a life of terror” in retaliation for those
abuses. 11 All of these arguments can be connected to the idea of America’s
counterterrorism policies generally and counterterrorism detention
specifically (Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib) serving as a recruiting tool.
These authors do not cite direct evidence of the problems associated with
counterterrorism detention, yet nonetheless the allegations sow doubt about
whether the status quo policies should be permanently memorialized in law.
Second, there are various scholars who claim that Guantanamo
(perhaps the most prominent example of U.S. detention policy) is
specifically a recruiting tool, and thus bad policy. Those who make that
claim say: (1) violent Muslim reaction to the Newsweek story about a Koran

7
Timothy K. Kuhner, The Corruption of Civilizations, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
349, 363 (2008). “But we must also recognize it to be pragmatically important, given that
terrorist recruitment thrives on our abandonment of our own values and on the reasonable
perceptions of U.S. foreign relations impropriety that follow.” Id. at 371.
8
Id. at 363.
9
See Megan Anne Healy, Comment, How the Legal Regimes of the European Union and
the United States Approach Islamic Terrorist Web Sites: A Comparative Analysis, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 165, 170 (2009).
10
One photo showed the battered face of a deceased prisoner. See Atif Rehman, Note,
The Court of Last Resort: Seeking Redress for Victims of Abu-Ghraib Torture Through the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 493, 511–12 (2006). Another photo
was of the bloodied body of a dead prisoner wrapped in cellophane packed in ice. Id. at 512.
There are still more photographs and videos that exist that are not released to the public. Id.
11
Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Lesser Evils’ in the War on Terrorism, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
335, 347 (2004).

Many observers suggest that the Abu Ghraib photos were the best terrorist recruitment tool
possible. Whether that is true or not, I don’t know. But I think it is fair to say that Abu Ghraib
increased the risk that a greater number of previously unmotivated individuals now feel
motivated to lead a life of terror . . . . There are situations where diligently respecting rights—in
other words fighting with one hand tied behind one’s back—may in fact enhance one’s ability to
fight by diminishing the will, appeal, frenzy, and recruitment of the enemy.

Id.
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being flushed down the toilet point to evidence of terrorist recruitment;12 (2)
Guantanamo as an image of civil rights violations such as prolonged
detention or torture serves as a terrorist recruiting tool because it incites
Muslims worldwide to act against the U.S. in revenge; 13 (3) Guantanamo is
highlighted in terrorist recruitment websites, which serves as evidence of
the United States “losing the moral high ground” and “[generating] the
resentment which is the key to building the next generation of terrorists”; 14
(4) Guantanamo detention functions as a greater tool for terrorist
recruitment than detention in Afghanistan or Iraq because transferring
members of the “insurgency is likely to spread grievances across
12
See William T. Hennessy, Willful and Outrageous Acts of Personal Abuse—Now OK
for the CIA?, 57 NAVAL L. REV. 203, 235 (2009) (stating that the military is rightfully
concerned that stories such as the Newsweek published story about a Koran being thrown in
a toilet at Guantanamo Bay serve as unnecessary fuel for the insurgents’ propaganda mill,
which will result in increased terrorist recruitment).
13
See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush
Administration, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389, 424 (2006) (“[E]ach person tortured, as
well as his/her family, are likely to become enemies of the U.S. and seek revenge for their
treatment, thus generating more potential enemies likely to threaten the security of this
country and its people.”); Douglass Cassel, Liberty, Judicial Review, and the Rule of Law at
Guantanamo: A Battle Half Won, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 37, 44–45 (2008) (“[I]ndefinite
detentions at Guantanamo . . . [enrage] Muslims worldwide, generating far more recruits for
the ‘radical Islamists’ than any plausible number of enemy combatants likely to be set free
by habeas.”); Mohamed R. Hassanien, International Law Fights Terrorism in the Muslim
World: A Middle Eastern Perspective, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 221, 245 (2008)
(“These generations would be living in crowded mega cities and will become attractive
recruits for radical groups . . . [and] will grow up angry and will seek someone to blame, in a
political atmosphere in which their impressions of the U.S. will be largely shaped by Abu
Ghraib and Guantanamo photos or stories.”); Michael P. O’Connor & Celia M. Rumann,
Fanning the Flames of Hatred: Torture, Targeting and Support for Terrorism, 48
WASHBURN L.J. 633, 664 (2009) (“[A]l Qaeda used ‘the fact that we torture people to recruit
new members, and then we’re going to have to deal with a whole new wave of terrorists.’ It
is this mechanism—recruitment based upon the outrage sparked by Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo—that has resulted in perhaps 80–90% of the foreign fighters coming to Iraq to
kill Americans in suicide bombings and other attacks.”); Jordan J. Paust, Serial War Crimes
in Response to Terrorism Can Pose Threats to National Security, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
5201, 5214 (2009) (noting that a serial war crimes governmental policy such as a common
plan to use unlawful coercive interrogation “undoubtedly . . . served as a terrorist recruitment
tool”); Symposium, Supreme Court Panel: Discussion & Commentary, 21 REGENT U. L.
REV. 385, 391–92 (2009) (“[Al Qaeda’s] recruits are fungible. An endless stream of people
remain willing to sign up, so you want to marginalize them in their societies. If you read the
transcripts of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s combatant status review tribunal hearing down at
Guantanamo . . . plays totally into [al Qaeda’s] narrative.”).
14
Kenneth Roth, Why the Current Approach to Fighting Terrorism Is Making Us Less
Safe, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 591 (2008) (“If you look at the terrorist recruiting
websites . . . they highlight Guantanamo, they highlight Abu Ghraib . . . . When the Bush
message is less attractive than the message of the terrorist recruiter, we are losing the fight
against terrorism and that is very much what is happening.”).
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geographic jurisdictions,” 15 and therefore insurgents should be detained and
prosecuted in the local area in which they were captured because it
centralizes the grievance and limits the ability to link to the global
insurgency; 16 and (5) Guantanamo is understood explicitly and implicitly as
a terrorist recruiting tool by policy makers and the international community.
For example, one article cites Dennis Blair, when he was nominee for
Director of National Intelligence, testifying that Guantanamo is “a rallying
cry for terrorist recruitment.” 17 Another article references the U.N. General
Assembly’s adoption on September 20, 2006 of the United Nations Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which recognized “conditions conducive to the
spread of terrorism” to include “dehumanization of victims of terrorism in
all its forms and manifestations.” 18 These direct assertions about
counterterrorism detention as a recruiting tool are mirror images of the
efforts by human rights groups to undermine the creation of a permanent
preventive detention regime. While Guantanamo has been the focus of
human rights groups for the past nine years, their focus is not just on the
closure of Guantanamo but also an end to preventive detention.19 What we
have witnessed in their campaign against Guantanamo is a mirror image of
15
Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95
VA. L. REV. 1745, 1818 (2009) (“[T]he capture, detention, and prosecution of insurgents are
potential grievances insurgents can use to attract new recruits or motivate existing
insurgents . . . . Guantánamo is an example. Detention policies in Afghanistan and Iraq
spark little backlash or protest compared to Guantánamo, and a global insurgency analysis
would predict that Guantánamo might inspire more terrorist than it holds.”).
16
Id.
17
Devon Chaffee, The Cost of Indefinitely Kicking the Can: Why Continued
“Prolonged” Detention Is No Solution To Guantánamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 187,
189–90 (2009).
18
See United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, G.A. Res. 60/288, Annex,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288, at 4 (Sept. 20, 2006); see also Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, G.A. Res. 61/171, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/171 (Mar. 1, 2007). “States must ensure that any measure taken to combat
terrorism complies with their obligations under international law, in particular international
human rights, refugee and humanitarian law.” Id. at 2. “[I]t is imperative that all States
work to uphold and protect the dignity of individuals and their fundamental freedoms, as
well as democratic practices and the rule of law, while countering terrorism.” Id. at 3.
Implicit in U.N. Resolution 61/171 is the recognition that violations of human rights,
humanitarian law, and the rule of law can exacerbate the fight against terrorism. See Paust,
supra note 13, at 5213–14.
19
See Suzanne Ito, Preventive Detention Must Be Repudiated and Overturned, ACLU
(Jan. 5, 2009, 6:33 PM), http://www.aclu.org/2009/01/05/preventive-detention-must-berepudiated-and-overturned (describing ACLU’s efforts to overturn preventive detention writ
large, not just close Guantanamo); see also David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive
Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (2009); David Glazier,
Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
957 (2009).
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the campaign they will mount against any changes that will make
permanent a preventive detention regime. 20
The final example of status quo inducing partisan discourse in the form
of scholars and other advocates sowing doubt about Guantanamo
specifically and preventive detention more generally is the category of
authors who tangentially suggest that Guantanamo and preventive detention
serves as a recruiting tool. Again, these scholars raise the argument but
offer little empirical support. Nonetheless, they are successful in sowing
doubt about the costs associated with a preventive detention regime. For
example, one article considered the circumstances under which members of
the Muslim-American community would voluntarily cooperate with police
efforts to combat terrorism; in the process of gathering respondents’
evaluation of current foreign and national security policy issues, the study
assumed that the Guantanamo detentions played a significant role in al
Qaeda propaganda. 21 The author did not primarily argue that Guantanamo
or preventive detention is a recruiting tool for al Qaeda; rather the author
accepted the argument as a fact, something that appears to be common
within the anti-preventive detention policy community. 22
Furthermore,
many
advocacy
groups
essentially
claim:
(1) Guantanamo symbolizes abuse of Muslim prisoners and serves to spur
al Qaeda’s terrorist recruitment in communities that identify with the
victim; 23 and (2) the existence of Guantanamo allowed U.S. policy to be
20

See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, Civil Liberties Groups Oppose Obama’s Plan to Close
Guantanamo, Absent Serious Changes, WASH. INDEPENDENT (Apr. 8, 2010, 12:51 PM),
http://washingtonindependent.com/81679/civil-liberties-groups-oppose-obamas-plan-toclose-gitmo-absent-serious-changes.
21
Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects
in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365,
378 (2010).
22
See infra notes 130–134 (providing websites of human rights groups).
23
See, e.g., KENNETH ROTH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2007, at 7 (2007)
(“[A]buses committed in the name of counterterrorism, [such as what happened in
Guantanamo,] have only aggravated the terrorist threat. The use of torture and arbitrary
detention spurs terrorist recruitment in communities that identify with the victims.”); John B.
Bellinger III, Shayana Kadidal, Clifford D. May & William Yeomans, Should Guantanamo
Bay Be Closed?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/
publication/21247/should_guantanamo_bay_be_closed.html (“[Guantanamo] has come to
symbolize abuse of Muslim prisoners and serves as a powerful recruiting tool for alQaeda . . . . No doubt, al-Qaeda does utilize Guantanamo as a recruiting tool . . . .
Guantanamo damaged our national security by tarnishing America’s standing in the world
and serving as a powerful recruiting tool for terrorists . . . . [Efforts to keep Guantanamo
open] are tantamount to giving Al Qaeda a major propaganda victory, as there is little the
organization would want more than to continue this recruiting and propaganda boon . . . .”);
Eight Years After 9-11, NAT’L SEC. NETWORK (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.nsnetwork.org/
node/1404 (“[Obama’s] condemnation of torture, his pledge to close Guantanamo, and the

862

GREGORY S. MCNEAL

[Vol. 101

misconstrued as a war against Islam, which fits perfectly with bin Laden’s
narrative of America’s contempt for Islam and Muslims. 24 The American
Civil Liberties Union even made a video of interviews with five former
Guantanamo detainees detailing their experience there, which illustrate
these two claims. 25
To further corroborate the claim, advocacy groups cite to prominent
political individuals, military figures, and distinguished journalists who all
argue that Guantanamo was a major recruiting tool for al Qaeda: President
Barack Obama, 2008 Republican presidential nominee Senator John
McCain, Matthew Alexander—the pseudonym of the Air Force Major and
interrogator who, without using torture, extracted information that led to
finding Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora, and
president of New America Foundation and two-time Pulitizer prize winner
Steve Coll. Obama based his conclusion off of intelligence that he sees as
Commander-in-Chief. 26 In addition, terrorist expert R.P. Eddy recognized
that Obama’s announcement to close Guantanamo hindered al Qaeda’s
ability to recruit, which is substantiated by Ayman al-Zawahri’s confused,
racially tinged attack on the Obama Administration. 27 McCain validated his
stance by noting that an “al Qaeda operative in a prison camp in Iraq” told

shutting down of secret prisons have weakened al-Qaeda’s recruiting ability and improved
America’s image abroad.”).
24
See, e.g., Stephen Flynn et al., Global War on Terror Series: The War on Terror—Are
We Losing?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.cfr.org/
publication/9258/global_war_on_terror_series.html (“[Guantanamo confirms] bin Laden’s
narrative . . . claims about America’s intentions, claims about American values, claims about
America’s contempt for Islam and Muslim have been borne out.”); Daniel B. Prieto,
Matthew C. Waxman & Robert McMahon, Closure of the Guantanamo Bay Prison Camp,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 6, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/publication/18493/
closure_of_the_guantanamo_bay_ prison_camp.html (“[Guantanamo’s effects] had direct
effects on our counterterrorism policies . . . in terms of serving as propaganda and an active
recruitment tool for terrorists and really inflaming public opinions around the world . . . .
[Guantanamo] also served as an easy aid for recruitment and also served to misconstrue—or
allow U.S. policy to be misconstrued as a war against Islam.”).
25
See Andrew Sullivan, Justice Denied: Former Detainees Speak Out, ATLANTIC (Nov.
3, 2009, 2:19 PM), http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/11/
former-detainees-speak-out.html.
26
See John Aloysius Farrell, Obama Defends Guantanamo Decisions, GLOBALPOST
(May 21, 2009, 2:54 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/notebook/diplomacy/090521/
obama-defends-guantanamo-decisions.
27
See Experts: Al Qaeda Tape Demonstrates that It Feels Threatened by Obama Victory,
NAT’L SECURITY NETWORK (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1068 (“Al
Qaeda recognizes that the promise of the Obama administration has already increased global
goodwill and thereby undermines al Qaeda’s extremist message and efforts to fundraise and
recruit.”).
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him this information. 28 Alexander supported his remarks because he heard
first hand from freedom fighters and Sunni Iraqis that Guantanamo was the
number one reason they had decided to join al Qaeda.29 Mora supported his
belief with testimony from U.S. flag-rank officers claiming that
Guantanamo was one of the main reasons why insurgent fighters joined al
Qaeda and subsequently caused U.S. combat deaths in Iraq. 30 When
testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, Steve Coll claimed
that in order to undermine al Qaeda’s efforts “to reconnect to its former
political, financial, and recruiting support,” the U.S. should, among other
things, “[close] Guantanamo.” 31
The narratives described above are repeated by the media, further
sowing doubts about the merits of preventive detention. For the most part,
the media serves as an echo chamber for the scholarly and think tank
community, making similar references and similar arguments. They
essentially claim that Guantanamo and preventive detention (1) currently
acts as a “centerpiece” in al Qaeda’s war against America;32 (2) serves as
rallying symbol of cruelty for insurgent fighters to join al Qaeda; 33 and (3)
28
See Cheney on the Fringe, NAT’L SECURITY NETWORK (Aug. 31, 2009),
http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1400 (“I think that these [enhanced] interrogations, once
publicized, helped al Qaeda recruit. I got that from an al Qaeda operative in a prison camp
in Iraq who told me that.”).
29
See Conservatives Attack America’s Legal System, NAT’L SECURITY NETWORK (Nov.
16, 2009), http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1467 (“I listened time and time again to foreign
fighters, and Sunni Iraqis, state that the number one reason they had decided to pick up arms
and join Al Qaeda was the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the authorized torture and abuse at
Guantanamo Bay . . . . Consequently it is clear that at least hundreds but more likely
thousands of American lives (not to count Iraqi civilian deaths) are linked directly to the
policy decisions to introduce the torture and abuse of prisoners as accepted tactics.”).
30
See Guantanamo Bay Must Be Closed to Keep America Safe, NAT’L SECURITY
NETWORK (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1507 (“Serving U.S. flag rank
officers . . . maintain that the first and second identifiable causes of U.S. combat deaths in
Iraq—as judged by their effectiveness in recruiting insurgent fighters into combat—are,
respectively the symbols of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.”).
31
See Steve Coll, House Testimony: The Paradoxes of Al Qaeda, NEW YORKER (Jan. 27,
2010),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2010/01/house-testimony-theparadoxes-of-al-qaeda.html (providing Coll’s testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives Armed Services Committee).
32
See James Gordon Meek, Gitmo Fades As ‘Recruiting Tool for Al Qaeda, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2010, 12:36 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dc/2010/01/gitmofades-as-recruiting-tool.html (“‘It’s not quite as front and center as it was during the Bush
administration,’ said Flashpoint Intelligence terror expert Evan Kohlmann. ‘But Gitmo is
still a centerpiece in Al Qaeda’s argument that nothing has changed in the U.S. since
Obama’s election.’”).
33
See, e.g., Matthew Alexander, Torture’s the Wrong Answer. There’s a Smarter Way,
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2008, at B01 (“I learned in Iraq that the No. 1 reason foreign fighters
flocked there to fight [for al Qaeda] were the abuses carried out at Abu Ghraib and
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drives those “undecided into the arms of the enemy.” 34 One article gives
hard figures, noting that Guantanamo and other counterterrorism detention
facilities were used as a recruiting tool as many as thirty-two times since
2001 and four times in 2010 alone. 35 Another article wrote about Sarham
Hassan Wisme, an Iraqi individual testifying that his attacks of American
soldiers and affiliation with al Qaeda was motivated by abuse of prisoners
held in detention at Abu Ghraib. 36

Guantanamo. Our policy of torture were directly and swiftly recruiting fighters for al-Qaeda
in Iraq.”); Editorial, The Torture Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at A42 (“Alberto
Mora . . . told the Senate committee that ‘there are serving U.S. flag-rank officers who
maintain that [main cause of] U.S. combat deaths in Iraq [was the result of] Guantanamo.”);
Guantanamo’s
Shadow,
ATLANTIC,
Oct.
2007,
at
40,
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/10/guantanamo-apos-s-shadow/6212/
(“Gitmo has become a symbol for cruelty and inhumanity that is repugnant to a wide sector
of the world community and a powerful tool that al Qaeda can use to damage US interest and
recruit others to its cause.”); Joshua Phillip, Guantanamo Detainees Will Be Moved to
Illinois Prison, EPOCH TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, at A1, available at http://epoch-archive.com/
a1/en/us/sfo/2009/12-Dec/17/A1_200912117_NoCA-US.pdf (“According to [National
Security Adviser James] Jones, ‘We think that by [moving Guantanamo detainees to a prison
in Illinois], we are removing from terrorist organizations around the world a recruiting tool
Guantanamo has come to symbolize.”); Julia Preston, Officials See Risk in the Release of
Photos and Videotapes of Iraqi Prisoner Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2005, at A12 (“It is
probable that Al Qaeda and other groups will seize upon these images and videos as grist for
their propaganda mill, which will result in, besides violent attacks, increased terrorist
recruitment . . . .”); Joby Warrick, To Combat Obama, Al-Qaeda Hurls Insults, WASH. POST,
Jan. 25, 2009, at A01.
34
See, e.g., Max Fisher, What We Can Learn from Saudi Intelligence, ATLANTIC, (Nov.
1, 2010, 2:45 PM) http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/11/what-we-canlearn-from-saudi-intelligence/65518/ (“Sending a suspected terrorist to Guantanamo or
Bagram risks angering his community and inspiring even more militancy.”); Charles C.
Krulak & Joseph P. Hoar, It’s Our Cage, Too, WASH. POST, May 17, 2007, at A17 (“The
torture methods . . . have nurtured the recuperative power of the enemy. The war will be
won or lost not on the battlefields but in the minds of potential supporters who have not yet
thrown in their lot with the enemy. If we forfeit our values by signaling that they are
negotiable in situations of grave or imminent danger, we drive those undecided into the arms
of the enemy.”).
35
See Meek, supra note 32 (“Thirty-two times since 2001 and four times this year alone,
senior Al Qaida in recruiting videos have used the prison at Guantanamo Bay as a clarion
call to bring extremists from around the world to join their efforts.”).
36
See Thomas E. Ricks, The Insurgent Who Loved ‘Titanic,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/07/
AR2009020701198.html (“Sarhan boasted of having planted more than 200 bombs for
attacks on U.S. troops. . . . [Sarhan] had started attacking the Americans in the spring of
2004, motivated by news of the American abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison west
of Baghdad. . . . In January 2007, [Sarhan] had affiliated with al Qaeda after hearing its
local mufti speak about the need to unify because the Americans were retreating from
Iraq . . . .”).
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Numerous prominent policymakers, such as President Obama, 37 House
Representative Jane Harman, 38 Senator Carl Levin, 39 Attorney General Eric
Holder, 40 and former U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair 41
are all on record claiming that either Guantanamo, preventive detention, or
Abu Ghraib acts as a recruiting tool for al Qaeda. A memorandum made by
the U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General mentioned
that Guantanamo was a tool used by al Qaeda “in spreading negative views
of the United States,” though it was only a brief reference. 42 In short, the
political discourse surrounding preventive detention generally, and
Guantanamo specifically, calls into question the prospects of reforming
current counterterrorism detention policies by raising doubts about the
merits of the status quo and any efforts to make current policies permanent.

37

See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21,
2009)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09) (“Meanwhile, instead of serving as a tool to
counter terrorism, Guantanamo became a symbol that helped al Qaeda recruit terrorists to its
cause. Indeed, the existence of Guantanamo likely created more terrorists around the world
than it ever detained.”).
38
See President Barack Obama, Report to American People About Security Mistakes;
Yemeni Threat Apparent (Jan. 9, 2010) (transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/1001/09/sitroom.01.html) (“I think if we really want to do counterterrorism
right, we have to eliminate one of Al Qaeda’s top recruiting tools, that’s Guantanamo Bay.”).
39
See Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing: The Origins of Aggressive
Interrogation Techniques, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) available at
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=299242 (“[A]l Qaeda and Taliban terrorists
are taught to expect Americans to abuse them. They’re recruited based on false propaganda
that says the United States is out to destroy Islam . . . . The abuse at Abu Ghraib was a
potent recruiting tool for al Qaeda and handed al Qaeda a propaganda weapon they could use
to peddle their violent ideology.”).
40
See Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks on the Closing of Guantanamo Bay (Apr.
29,
2009)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/
ag-speech-090429.html) (“Guantanamo has come to represent a time and an approach that
we want to put behind us: a disregard for our centuries-long respect for the rule of law and a
go-it alone approach that alienated our allies, incited our adversaries and ultimately
weakened our fight against terrorism.”).
41
See Nomination of Admiral Dennis Blair to be Director of National Intelligence:
Hearing before S. Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Admiral
Dennis C. Blair USN (Ret.)), available at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/
20090122_testimony.pdf (“I agree with the President that the detention center at
Guantanamo has become a damaging symbol to the world and that it must be closed. It is a
rallying cry for terrorist recruitment and harmful to our national security.”).
42
OFFICE OF THE U.S. INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE
FBI’S INVOLVEMENT IN AND OBSERVATION OF DETAINEE INTERROGATION IN GUANTANAMO
BAY, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ 72 (2008), available at www.justice.gov/oig/special/
s0805/final.pdf (“[I]n addition to being ineffective and short-sighted, using [aggressive
techniques implemented in Guantanamo] was wrong and helped al-Qaeda in spreading
negative views of the United States.”).
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Of course if only one side were heard in the debate over
counterterrorism detention, we might see a change in policy that favored the
goals of human rights groups. But supporters of preventive detention and
Guantanamo are equally vocal in their assertion that Guantanamo and
preventive detention are not recruiting tools. These counterarguments
reinforce the status quo by bringing about an information-induced
equilibrium, sowing doubt about whether weakening the current regime of
counterterrorism detention is wise. While no academic has written an
article claiming that preventive detention or Guantanamo does not serve as
a recruitment tool, many think tanks and commentators have.
The main argument made by think tanks in support of preventive
detention and in opposition to the notion that Guantanamo serves as a
recruiting tool is that Guantanamo is rarely mentioned in the messages
delivered by top al Qaeda leaders. Assuming that the list of collected
statements and interviews from top al Qaeda leaders are representative of al
Qaeda’s recruiting propaganda, 43 those past statements reveal that top al
Qaeda officials rarely mention preventive detention or Guantanamo. 44
Moreover, even in the messages where Guantanamo is referenced, it is
incorrectly conflated with Abu Ghraib 45 (though this does not necessarily
preclude the fact that preventive detention may act as a recruiting tool) and
when mentioned it is mentioned very briefly. For example, Dr. Ayman alZawahiri, one of al Qaeda’s top strategists, gave a twelve-page statement
entitled “Nine Years After the Start of the Crusader Campaign” with four
pages devoted to Pakistan, two pages to Afghanistan, nearly two to Egypt,
two to Palestinians, and two to al Qaeda’s prospects for victory. 46 In this

43

Advocates concede that there may be other messages not included in the sample and
that collected statements and interviews from al Qaeda may only be partial translations. See
Thomas Joscelyn, Gitmo Is Not Al Qaeda’s ‘Number One Recruitment Tool,’ WKLY.
STANDARD (Dec. 27, 2010, 2:24 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/gitmo-not-alqaedas-number-one-recruitment-tool_524997.html?page=1. However, the advocates go on
to say that it is safe to assume that what was recorded in the collected statements and
interviews includes most of what “al Qaeda’s honchos have said publicly since January
2009.” Id.
44
See id.
The translations for the thirty-four messages are available at
Translations/Transcriptions of Statements by al-Qaida Leadership, NINE ELEVEN FINDING
ANSWERS (NEFA) FOUNDATION, http://nefafoundation.org/index.cfm?pageID=44 (last
visited Apr. 10, 2011).
45
See Benjamin Wittes, Dan Byman on Guantanamo as Recruitment Tool, LAWFARE
(Dec.
28,
2010,
8:59
AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/
dan-byman-on-guantanamo-as-recruitment-tool/.
46
See Karl Rove, Gitmo Is Not a Recruiting Tool for Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30,
2010, at A13. The statement can be found at Zawahiri: 09.15.2010 Ayman al-Zawahiri Nine
years After the Start of the Crusader Campaign, WORLD ANALYSIS (Sept. 15, 2010, 6:02
AM), http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=1476.
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same statement, only a single sentence mentioned how the Koran was
desecrated in Guantanamo, Iraq, and elsewhere.47 In fact, a keyword search
of all the messages by top al Qaeda leaders yielded only seven mentions of
Guantanamo, while there are numerous more mentions of words like
Israel/Israeli/Israelis (ninety-eight mentions), Jew/Jews (ninety-four
mentions), Zionist(s) (ninety-four mentions), and other words that focus on
the overall Zionist-Crusader conspiracy narrative against Muslims. 48
The think tank message has not penetrated as deeply into media
depictions of preventive detention as the opposition message has. In fact
there are few sources directly arguing that preventive detention is not a
recruiting tool. The only colorable argument could be that there will be no
less recruiting by al Qaeda once Guantanamo is closed, 49 which suggests
that Guantanamo exclusively cannot be a major recruiting tool for al Qaeda
if the next detention facility and its complete absence of civil liberties
violations, would be denounced by al Qaeda in the same manner. This
notion reinforces the idea that a change from the status quo is unlikely if the
new policy will face the same critiques as the status quo policies.
The political discourse over the merits of preventive detention and
Guantanamo reinforces the status quo in counterterrorism detention policy.
This is so because to bring about change, the first challenge is to convince
policymakers that a problem is worthy of being addressed. This means it
would be worthy of a place on the policy agenda, including time dedicated
to hearings, and the support of party leaders who will make decisions about
what discussions will move from committee to a floor vote. Overcoming
the bias towards the status quo in counterterrorism detention requires
overcoming substantial obstacles in a policy domain with few easy
choices. 50
47

See Rove, supra note 46, at A13.
See Joscelyn, supra note 98, at 1. Other word mentions include: Palestine/Palestinian
(200), Gaza (131), Crusader (322), Afghanistan (333), Iraq (157), Pakistan (331). Id. James
Gordon Meek from the New York Daily obtained similar results: only fifty-eight out of
hundreds of public statements and interviews between 2003 and 2009 contained references
of al Qaeda griping about Guantanamo Bay. See Rove, supra note 46, at A13.
49
See Andrew Cohen, Charles and Umar Escape Guantanamo, ATLANTIC (Jan. 13,
2010,
7:55
AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/01/
charles-and-umar-escape-guantanamo/33292/.
50
See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO
WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 247 (2009).
48

The first threshold is to convince gatekeepers that a problem is worthy of being taken up . . . .
[T]he push forward to hearings and serious consideration will often be stymied by the lack of
available space on the agenda or by outright opposition by subcommittee and committee chairs.
To pass through the next gate, advocates must gain the support of the party leaders who decide
what advances out of committee to a floor vote. Since this is Congress, every challenge is times
two—two houses must advance legislation so that it may be enacted. It is a process full of

868

GREGORY S. MCNEAL

[Vol. 101

The discussion above highlights that policymakers and the public are
aware of the problems associated with preventive detention, the potential
costs, and plausible solutions. The reality is that shared information is
pervasive in diffuse policy communities focused on these issues. 51 Interest
groups are commonly aware “of the facts and figures associated with the
justification for the current policy, various proposals to change it, and
research or experiences . . . suggesting how any policy changes might be
implemented.” 52 This aggregation of information, rather than prompting
changes instead reinforces the status quo. Why? Because
individual policymakers typically do not have the ability single-handedly to change
the collective understandings of entire policy communities. . . . [A] policy community
is made up of experts, and they were not born yesterday; naïve is not the operating
rule within Washington, after all. A policy community, even if it is riven by deep
divisions, provides the opportunity for experts to share common information and to
develop common understandings of the shape, direction, and justifications of public
53
policy.

Expertise on counterterrorism detention is in abundance, and most of
the expert opinions probably end up cancelling each other out, there is thus
little impetus for movement away from the status quo policy in any
direction (e.g., a more rights protective regime or a more security protective
regime).
B. WHAT IS U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION POLICY?

In light of the preceding discussion of the political discourse
surrounding counterterrorism detention, one may wonder how we can
separate the rhetoric from the reality. If the partisan discourse is stripped
away, what is U.S. detention policy? This seems like a simple question, but
explaining counterterrorism detention policy may in fact be one of the most
difficult quandaries in national security law and policy. Unlike the question
of what rules govern criminal arrests, there is no hornbook one can turn to
for quick guidelines on what U.S. policy is or should be. Thus, to explain
U.S. policy, I will critically evaluate Detention and Denial: The Case for
Candor After Guantanamo, which is the best case for detention reform in
any scholarly publication.54 The book, authored by Ben Wittes of the
Brookings Institution, explains how there is simply no comprehensible
resistance. Overcome the friction, and substantial policy change may follow, but it is not easy to
overcome the high level of friction apparent in Washington policy making.

Id.
51
52
53
54

Id. at 249 & ch.3.
Id. at 250.
Id.
See generally WITTES, supra note 5.
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policy behind U.S. counterterrorism detentions. Detention is a thing the
U.S. government does through a patchwork of existing authorities whose
defining characteristic is incoherence:
It is less a policy than a set of arrangements made in the absence of a policy. And at
the core of its incoherence is its attempt to deal with a complex policy problem in the
absence of clear rules. Nobody knows today exactly when it is legal to detain the
enemy in counterterrorism operations, who counts as the enemy, what procedures the
executive and courts must follow in evaluating detention cases, and what rights and
protections the detainees must receive in the process. All of this is in flux, with
different answers proposed for different facilities, different legal regimes, and
55
different detainees. Uncertainty is the only sure thing.

This is not to say there are no rules or boundaries delimiting this
incoherence. Rather, rules abound in counterterrorism detentions, but
knowing which ones apply, when they apply, and how they apply are all
open questions whose answers depend on location, context, and the whims
of actors in the system.
The failure of the American political system to engage seriously with
the rules governing counterterrorism detention policy has placed the
responsibility for defining those rules in the hands of foreign governments
and unelected judges. 56 Wittes argues that when foreign proxies are used to
house detainees, the U.S. “delegates to those countries the power to define
the permissible boundaries of U.S. national security detentions. It
relinquishes control over the conditions of confinement, and it also
relinquishes control over the criteria for release.”57 Want to know what
U.S. policy governs detentions in the U.S.-built Bagram prison? Your
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request will need to be addressed to
Kabul, not D.C. 58
Things are no better when it comes to detentions closer to home.
Which elected official should Joe Citizen hold responsible when a released
Guantanamo detainee decides to attack a shopping mall in Peoria? There is
no identifiable, responsible person when judges are running the show.
Instead detention of Guantanamo detainees, Wittes explains, is governed by
the rules developed in the common law habeas process in the D.C. district
courts and then reviewed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.59 Wittes

55

Id. at 10, 32.
Id. at 59–60.
57
Id. at 59.
58
Peter Graff, Afghans Agree to Take Over U.S. Prison at Bagram, REUTERS NEWS (Jan.
9, 2010, 1:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/09/us-afghanistan-bagramidUSTRE6081IN20100109.
59
See WITTES, supra note 5, at 60.
56
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does not argue that judges are incapable of deciding detention cases,60 nor
does he argue that they are incapable of making rules to govern their
process—rather, his point is that obfuscation has delegated this role to
parties that are more constrained, less visible, and less accountable than the
nation’s political leadership. 61 If you are upset about that mall in Peoria,
your letter should not be mailed to Congress or the White House; rather,
you should mail it to a judge’s chambers in D.C.
Of course, the notion that a released Guantanamo detainee may
commit an act of terrorism is just an obvious, and perhaps unrealistic, cost
of delegating to judges the responsibility for making rules regarding
counterterrorism detentions. The bigger cost, according to Wittes, is that
when these judges interpret the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (AUMF), 62 they are evaluating the substantive authority to detain the
enemy, but “they also necessarily interpret the scope of the substantive
authority to target the enemy, or, more generally, to wage war on the
enemy.” 63 Who may be targeted and captured by soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and Marines on far off battlefields will be dictated less by the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief, Congress, or senior military leadership, and more by
the developing case law governing a few dozen Guantanamo detainees.
The fact that those cases mostly involved low-level Taliban members, that
their cases were nearly a decade old, or that the evidence was not gathered
with an eye towards habeas litigation under rules that would take years to
develop, will not alter the binding nature of those precedents on current and
future conflicts. 64 The Executive Branch and Congress have refused to
define the rules governing their conflict “and the result has been that a
60

See id. at 60 (“What the decision does mean is that for good or ill, the rules will be
written by judges through the common law process of litigating habeas corpus cases of the
detainees still held at Guantanamo.”). Wittes comes close to criticizing the judges when he
writes, “This body of law doesn’t look much like the law that a sensible political system
would design. Indeed, I would suggest that it serves the key interests of neither the detainees
nor the government.” Id. at 62.
61
Id. at 91.
62
S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001).
63
WITTES, supra note 5, at 61.
64
See id.
[H]ow do we avoid repeating the bait-and-switch that we have engineered for ourselves? How
do we avoid capturing people and justifying their initial detention based on crude intelligence,
imagining ourselves to be operating within a relatively conventional law-of-war framework, and
then finding our allies, our courts, and our own consciences pushing us toward applying a much
higher set of standards down the road?

Id. at 120; cf. id. at 112–13 (“Those concerned primarily with security have no more reason
to admire the current arrangements. . . . The most they can honestly say for the system is
that it does not necessarily mean more trouble than a big bait-and switch for a declining
group of people at Guantanamo . . . .”).
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diffuse set of actors have been groping their way toward rules in the
absence of clear guidance and in the face of the need to decide large
numbers of individual cases.” 65 This is, in a word, suboptimal. It is
amazing that the executive branch allows this judicially driven uncertainty
to endure.
The system is also suboptimal for detainees, because while it puts
“pressure on the government to resolve detainee cases in general,
adjudications are not functioning quickly enough to matter to the vast
majority of individual detainees.” 66 Moreover, as the D.C. Circuit pointed
out in Al Maqaleh v. Gates, only Guantanamo detainees get habeas review;
the detainee at Bagram or anywhere else approximating the theater of
conflict is not entitled to review. 67 As Wittes notes, habeas is the only
opportunity detainees have to challenge their detention, “[j]udges hear the
initial case. They rule, and if they rule against the detainee and the
judgment withstands appeal, future detention reverts to purely a matter of
executive discretion—forever.” 68 It seems the system is at least consistent
in its suboptimality, neither the government nor detainees seem to benefit
from the status quo. If a bias in favor of the status quo is the result of fear
of the uncertainty regarding what change might bring about, that fear must
be substantial and perhaps even irrational, because the current system is not
only suboptimal in advancing the goals of detainees or the government, it is
also woefully inadequate at providing certainty. Consider some of the
questions that have not been resolved as a matter of U.S. counterterrorism
detention policy; these are questions which should represent a great deal of
uncertainty for the government and for human rights groups, and will
largely be resolved by judges, without any input from either interest group:
“Who bears the burden of proof in these cases, and what is that
burden—that is, who has to prove what?” 69 What are the boundaries of the
President’s detention power—that is, assuming that the government can
prove that a detainee is who it claims him to be, what sort of person is it
lawful to detain? 70 “What sort of evidence can the government use?” 71
“How should the courts handle intelligence data or evidence that may have
65

Id. at 62.
Id.
67
See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (reversing decision below
and dismissing habeas petitions by detainees in Afghanistan, stating: “Upon review, and
applying the Supreme Court decision in Boumediene, we determine that the district court did
not have jurisdiction to consider the petitions for habeas corpus. We therefore reverse the
order of the district court and order that the petitions be dismissed.”).
68
WITTES, supra note 5, at 63.
69
Id. at 64.
70
Id.
71
Id.
66

872

GREGORY S. MCNEAL

[Vol. 101

been given involuntarily?” 72 Who is the “class of people subject to
noncriminal detention”? Is it al Qaeda? The Taliban? Associated Forces?
Supporters or substantial supporters? Functional members? Those falling
under the command structure of the enemy organization? Those who
provided independent support? Those who must be detained to prevent
them from returning to the battlefield? Those who are likely to rejoin the
enemy or pose a current threat? 73
If membership is what counts for detention, when does membership
end? If one is once a member are they always a member, and therefore
always detainable? If the relationship can be vitiated, what does it take to
vitiate it and who bears the burden of proving vitiation? 74 Does acting as a
cooperating witness on behalf of the government count, or does it only
matter if the detainee was a member of the enemy organization at the time
of capture? 75 Must there be evidence of affirmative disassociation or
merely expulsion from the organization? 76 Does evidence have a half-life
such that “evidence that would suffice to justify detention at an earlier stage
no longer suffices at the point of habeas review?” Or vice versa, does the
“standard that the judges apply in habeas review theoretically apply at the
point that the government acquires custody?” 77 These are just some of the
open questions in counterterrorism detentions, illustrating the uncertainty of
current policies it seems that—in counterterrorism detention policy,
uncertainty abounds. 78

72

Id. at 65.
Id. at 68–69.
74
Id. at 70.
75
Id. at 73.
76
Id. at 75.
77
Id. at 70.
78
Other questions include: How should hearsay be treated? Are “intelligence reports
that record or summarize information provided by various sources; records and summaries of
statements made by detainees during interrogation; and transcripts and summaries of
statements made by detainees when appearing before [various administrative panels]
admissible and probative?”
Is “reliability a necessary condition for admissibility or simply a critical factor in
assessing the weight to be given to the evidence?” Id. at 76. “[W]hen is an interrogation
sufficiently coercive to require either exclusion of a resulting statement from evidence or a
significant diminution of the weight it is accorded?” Id. at 77. What interrogation methods
will or will not produce admissible statements and how long and under what circumstances
will the taint of coercive interrogations persist? Id. at 81. “Should allegations made by the
government be treated as elements of a criminal offense, whereby a failure to prove one
element means a failure of proof overall?” Id. at 81. Or should the court “take a more
impressionistic view of the overall picture, using what the intelligence community calls the
‘mosaic theory’ of evidence?” Id. at 81.
73
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The goal in recanting these questions first raised by Wittes and
developed in much greater detail in Detention and Denial is to note the
uncertainty that is already present in U.S. counterterrorism detention
policy. Advocates who claim that they fear changing the status quo due to
the uncertainty of what might result, fail to recognize that the current
system is wrought with uncertainties—yet still the status quo endures.
C. REASONS FOR POLICY DISARRAY AND THE STRENGTH OF THE
STATUS QUO

U.S. counterterrorism detention policy is in disarray and the costs of
this disarray have been hidden through a series of policy work-arounds that
Wittes described as “shame, denial, and obfuscation.” 79 The U.S. detains
suspected terrorists only when necessary and generally avoids that necessity
by killing people (think unmanned aerial vehicles like Predator drones) or
letting them go 80 (“catch and release”). When it is necessary to detain
people, some of those detainees are prosecuted in federal courts, while
others are held in theater internment facilities run by nations willing to do
the dirty work of the U.S. 81 This policy has moral costs, security costs, and
rights costs, and has created a system that is costly in the short-run and
unsustainable in the long-run. 82
In light of these costs, how can the status quo endure? It is not for a
lack of ideas and proposed reforms. In fact, Detention and Denial is an
example of a comprehensive retrospective review of U.S. counterterrorism
detention policy, and a prospective template for reform. Much like Wittes’s
prior work, it is thoughtful, incisive, stripped of partisanship, and loaded
with practical solutions.83 If only this were enough to bring about policy
change. Unfortunately, in Washington, D.C., lots of great ideas compete
for policy attention and only an appropriate alignment of events and
interests can provide the window for policy change. Wittes, a veteran D.C.
policy watcher, knows this and acknowledges as much when he writes, “I
recognize that if our paralysis is as complete as I suggest, the book
79

WITTES, supra note 5, at 5.
Id. at 5.
81
Id. at 3–6; see Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897
(Jan. 22, 2009).
82
Id. at 126.
83
See BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR (2008); see also Stephen I. Vladeck,
The Long War, the Federal Courts, and the Necessity/Legality Paradox, 43 U. RICH. L. REV.
893 (2009) (reviewing BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR (2008)); Curtis A.
Bradley, Terror and the Law: The Limits of Judicial Reasoning in the Post-9/11 World,
FOREIGN AFF., July 1, 2008, at 132; Gregory S. McNeal, Please the Courts: Can Judges and
Juries Win the War on Terror?, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 11, 2008, at 44.
80
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necessarily takes on something of the quality of an academic exercise—the
crafting of a policy strategy for a country that prefers not to have a
policy.” 84 Indeed, the country may prefer no policy today, but someday the
U.S. may need to craft one, and when that day comes, Wittes’s work will be
a starting point for reform. However, we should ask ourselves whether
reform is even possible? Perhaps instead we should be pessimistic, seeing
the country that, in Wittes’s words, “prefers not to have a policy?” 85 The
policy paralysis associated with the status quo is, as I highlighted above,
emboldened by limitless arguments for and against the current system. 86
This paralysis
serves nobody. It does not serve the military or any other component of the U.S.
government that has to operate overseas. The system’s random operations make a
mockery of the human rights concerns that gave rise to the very spotty judicialization
of detention to date. Our current system is one whose parts interact in ridiculous and
ill-considered ways that create absurd and perverse incentives. It is a system that no
rational combination of values or strategic considerations would have produced; it
could have emerged only as a consequence of a clash of interests that produced a clear
victory for nobody. The result is that it reflects no coherent policy choices . . . we
87
continue to ignore those choices at our considerable peril.

What might that peril be? Both the Obama and Bush Administrations
released dangerous detainees, including suicide bombers and terrorist
leaders. 88 Of course, both Administrations also released people whom they
admitted were not properly detained in the first place.89 It seems that peril
and paralysis are linked concepts—the peril of continuing to hold an
innocent person sits in equipoise with the peril of a recidivist detainee
harming someone—both are plausible examples of harm that policy
advocates can raise—and the elevation of such claims could reinforce
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many members felt far less strongly about the underlying issues associated with detention than
about the need to make sure that detainees came nowhere near their districts.
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paralysis and a bias towards the status quo. When coupled with obfuscation
of policy failures, hiding of policy costs, and denial of policy problems, the
status quo becomes a powerful force. 90
Of course, the power of the status quo that Wittes describes is
emblematic of the status quo bias in nearly every area of American
politics. 91 In these cases, a clash of interests produces a suboptimal policy
outcome that some might describe as a compromise, but none would
describe as a victory. What makes U.S. counterterrorism detention policy
any different? Most groups involved in debates over detention policy
recognize the problems with the status quo, but are unable or unwilling to
advocate for change. Wittes argues that civil liberties and human rights
activists have made a tactical judgment that the status quo is preferable to
the uncertainty they may face if the United States decides to pass legislation
governing counterterrorism detentions; 92 while government lawyers and
members of the Bush Administration echoed these precautionary
sentiments.93
The preference that groups may hold for the certain (albeit suboptimal)
present over the uncertainty of change is not a concept unique to U.S.
counterterrorism detention policy; rather, this preference is a regular facet
of American political life. 94 Wittes’s helpful contribution is his argument
not only that U.S. policy is suboptimal, but also that it is incomplete, and
therefore the status quo is uncertain for all and reform can remedy this
uncertainty problem. 95 According to Wittes, there are entire areas of
detention policy where the political branches have refused to craft rules
with any degree of specificity; thus, in a crisis situation “we live with the
uncertainty of not having any [rules] and fall back on whatever ill-fitting
legal architecture makes itself available.”96 That uncertainty can’t serve
any side in the debate, and thus it provides an opportunity for policy
change.
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D. POWER POLITICS OVER POLICY?

If human rights groups and government attorneys admit that the
current system of detention is suboptimal, but argue against change because
they fear the uncertainty of what legislation might bring, 97 that suggests that
there must be adequate certainty within the current system. However, in
light of Wittes’s litany of open and uncertain substantive and procedural
questions, one has to wonder if more than just fear of uncertainty is
animating the status quo bias.
How is it possible that the government and rights groups both prefer
the current system? After all, as described by Wittes, this is a system that
does not serve the goals of either group, does not provide certainty
regarding process or outcome, and forecloses the ability to influence and
lobby about the development of that uncertain future. Something else must
account for the status quo bias. One plausible explanation for this status
quo bias is that political actors in general and executive branch actors in
particular will tolerate the current system until such time as they must
change the system. This perspective is best represented by the approach
followed by the Bush Administration during its entire tenure. Jack
Goldsmith describes how David Addington, legal counsel to Vice President
Cheney, repeatedly dismissed any advice that sought to garner the support
of Congress in the process of policy change. 98 Addington believed that the
risks of a diminishment in presidential power were too high if the Executive
Branch approached the Legislative Branch and was rebuffed. Thus, in his
view, if a policy could be justified “on the President’s sole authority,” and
going to Congress might limit that authority, any policy change beyond the
status quo (which was an executive-controlled policy equilibrium) was
something the Administration should not seek. 99 As a result of this
resistance to change, the Administration followed a unilateral approach,
which only yielded to outside pressure for change when faced with formal
mandates such as Supreme Court review. 100 The consequential long-term
undermining of policy effectiveness was left for later, to be dealt with in
97
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Addington’s words, “when and if it is necessary to do so.” 101 “Do nothing
until it is absolutely necessary to do something” seems to be an acceptable
approach to some when it comes to counterterrorism detention policy.
A more cynical explanation may be that for interest groups,
counterterrorism detention policy is more about politics than policy. For
example, some commentators have claimed that it is politically unrealistic
to consider prosecuting President Obama and other senior Administration
officials for their counterterrorism policies, yet they believe that it is
appropriate to perhaps prosecute officials at some future point in time. 102
Kenneth Anderson believes this suggests that the feasibility of
accountability through prosecutions (the harshest form of opposition to
status quo policies) is rooted in politics more than policy. He writes, “If it
is politically unrealistic to consider going after Barack Obama and Harold
Koh and Leon Panetta and Joe Biden, et al., and that is the reason for not
pursuing criminal sanctions that follow upon criminality, well, one has to
wonder when it will be politically realistic?” 103 His view is that opposition
to current counterterrorism policies will likely be “politically realistic”
when the administration in question is Republican rather than
Democratic. 104 Under this cynical worldview, the time for policy change
101
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Mary Ellen O’Connell, a law professor and expert for the ACLU and CCR who stated, in
response to his query as to whether President Obama was a serial killer who should be
prosecuted:
We know that many countries have had their leadership commit very serious violations of
international law with no accountability, the human rights community, international law
community is committed to trying to change that, but we’ve had a setback over these last years
and I don’t expect it to happen. So I don’t see any real purpose in arguing about those matters.
I’m interested in going forward and getting our country into compliance with international law,
and we can talk about accountability later.
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will be shortly after the election of a president who is not ideologically
aligned with human rights groups.
E. QUESTIONS OF LEGITIMACY

If, however, cynicism does not rule the day, and the issue is one of
policy and not politics, perhaps the fundamental explanation for the lack of
reform and preference for the status quo is that Wittes—who wants to make
preventive detention a permanent feature of U.S. policy—believes that
preventive detention is both legal and legitimate.105 Unfortunately, many
outside the U.S. and many within rights groups may not subscribe to the
legitimacy of detention. In fact, no matter how persuasively Wittes makes
the case that preventive detention has a long and legitimate pedigree (and I
think he does make that case), his opponents may never be swayed.
“Legitimacy,” say academics, “is a generalized perception or assumption
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and
definitions.” 106 In many policy domains, legitimacy flows from conformity
with the practices of external “legitimacy providers.” 107 To move from the
status quo to Wittes’s preferred formalization of detention policy, and to do
so in a way that would be deemed legitimate by human rights groups and
allies abroad would require U.S. policy to conform to the standards in
nations that do not practice preventive detention (because they view it as
illegitimate). 108
Herein lies the challenge for Wittes’s (and others) reform proposals—
the legitimacy that comes from conformity with the principles that are
policies are identical, a wave of law scholars produce an endless number of scholarly tomes and
declarations, promptly submitted by the ACLU and CCR to courts everywhere they can find as
earnest amicus briefs, that it really is different. It is very hard for me to see, as a pure political
matter in the demimonde of the activist-scholar, international law advocacy community, that
“politically realistic” is not simply another way of saying, “Republican administration.”
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palatable to human rights groups and Europeans will necessarily be in
conflict with any preventive detention regime premised upon criminal law
and human rights standards. Wittes admits as much when he writes that
there will be trade-offs and likely no win-wins. 109 This is perhaps his most
critical point—the status quo is unmovable absent a crisis, one that is far off
and perhaps hard for policymakers and the electorate to comprehend. He
writes:
The American polity is not good at issues in which it is asked to make painful choices
in the present by way of averting greater pain at some indeterminate point in the
future. Few societies are. It is hard with respect to climate change and carbon
emissions and with respect to national debt. And it is even harder with respect to
writing rules that allow the government to deprive of liberty people that we have not
yet captured—people that, we can tell ourselves, do not exist and that we will
110
therefore never capture.

In short, because new counterterrorism detention policies will be
different from the current practices in place in other nations, a reform
proposal cannot capture the attention of policymakers because almost any
reform proposal will be seen as illegitimate by some. It may maximize
security, or certainty, or rights, but the biggest hurdle to overcome is not
those values—the values Wittes’s proposals maximize—instead, the biggest
hurdle is legitimacy, an amorphous value that is difficult to maximize
absent conformity, and conformity is in the eye of the beholder
The legitimacy challenges outlined above are further complicated by
the fact that, most policy and political actors are not as rationally
calculating as Wittes seems to hope. Rather, they are satisficing, making
incremental decisions based on limited data.111 The policy process, when
understood this way, is not a rational comprehensive process that will
generate the best policy outcome, but is rather a series of “successive
limited comparisons” in which actors make choices about the status quo,
and the feasible alternatives. 112 In this framework, legitimacy is a key
feasibility criterion, and perhaps the insurmountable obstacle facing reform
minded advocates like Wittes.

109

See WITTES, supra note 83, at 143.
Id.
111
See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 118–20 (3d ed. 1976) (contrasting the
economic and administrative approaches to uncertainty: “Whereas economic man
supposedly maximizes—selects the best alternative from among all those available to him—
his cousin, the administrator, satisfices—looks for a course of action that is satisfactory or
“good enough”).
112
Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79
(1959).
110

880

GREGORY S. MCNEAL

[Vol. 101

Taken together, what lessons can we learn from Wittes? His reform
proposals are sensible, and as a normative matter, proper. I agree with the
underlying premise upon which his case for candor rests—that detention is
a necessary tool of security with a long history in American law.113 I also
agree with his contention that the U.S. should not put off change, shirking
its responsibilities in the hope that new challenges won’t overwhelm the
system. 114 Nonetheless, as the preceding discussion highlights, reform
advocates face significant challenges overcoming the bias towards the
status quo.
III. THE CASE FOR PESSIMISM
Despite my agreement with Wittes and other reformers, I believe a
case for pessimism can and should be made, if for no other reason than to
outline the major obstacles standing in the way of reform. The story told
thus far is one of a hyper-political discourse, coupled with a
counterproductive detention policy that neither serves the interests of the
government nor the interests of human rights. Yet the policy endures.
What accounts for the power of the status quo? The durability may be a
consequence of a failure on the part of the United States both to
acknowledge that problems exist and conscious efforts to hide failures.
This denial has proven itself as a flexible tool for managing detentions, that
is, “[i]t has given the United States a relatively stable and reasonably
favorable short-term equilibrium, one in which international pressure over
detention matters has declined dramatically.” 115 While effective in the short
run, human rights and civil liberties activists on one side and government
lawyers on the other side all seem to admit that a legislative policy fix
would be preferable. 116 Denial alone though, cannot explain the status quo
because, to many advocates, the time to fix detention policy is now. 117
Which raises the question, if the problems are as serious as some contend
(and I believe they are), what explains the lack of change?
A. THE POWER OF THE STATUS QUO

Policy scholars have proven that the power of the status quo is a
dominant feature in federal policymaking. 118 One way to understand the
113
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power of the status quo is to envision it as a consequence of friction in the
policymaking process. This friction prevents change from coming about, at
least until the pressure for change overcomes the friction of the status
quo. 119 Wittes admits as much when he notes that change may be unlikely
until the U.S. is engaged in a conflict that overwhelms the nation’s capacity
to detain, either due to a mass influx of detainees or due to special
categories of detainees whose intelligence value may be lost due to the
inability of the U.S. to appropriately detain them. 120 At that point we may
see pressure for change (albeit late, and at some cost). A way of
understanding this in friction terms is to recognize that there is a constant
undercurrent of pressure in favor of changing detention policy. The effect
of that pressure may be zero, until it crosses a threshold, and over that
threshold we may witness a substantial amount of policy movement.
However, short of sufficient political pressure—likely prompted by the dim
future painted by Wittes—I fail to see how reforms in counterterrorism
policy will come about.
B. ATTENTION AND THE STATUS QUO

Part of the challenge in bringing about a change from the status quo is
the ability to focus the attention of policymakers. 121 This is not to say that
attention to counterterrorism detention is nonexistent, rather attention to the
problem seems to be constant, but so too is information in support of and
opposed to current policies. In Part II, I described how a hyper-partisan
discourse surrounds counterterrorism detention policy debates, noting how
arguments about Guantanamo specifically and counterterrorism detention
policy generally, can lead to the status quo. Similarly, Wittes notes that
human rights groups from the left have demonized preventive detention
while those on the right have made Guantanamo an ideological
commitment and plank in their political platform. 122 In this policy context
it is difficult to focus the attention of policymakers, and persuasive
arguments are not as new or persuasive as advocates may believe them to
be. As prominent policy scholars have noted, “the problem is rarely the
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scarcity of information, but rather its overabundance—policy makers don’t
know how to make sense of it all, being overwhelmed with so much
information coming at them from [interest groups] on all kinds of
issues.” 123 For detention policy, attention may be present but other
priorities may seem more urgent. As this Article was entering the editorial
process, the healthcare debate, 124 targeted killing and Predator drones in
Libya, 125 and WikiLeaks 126 were the policy issues of the day, by the time
this Article is in print, those issues will likely be replaced by more
contemporary issues. If the status quo is to be changed, serious attention
must be focused on changing it, and that can only happen with a policy
window akin to the future crisis Wittes describes, and even then policy
leaders must be convinced that the status quo policy is seriously, not just
marginally flawed. 127
C. THE NEED TO JUSTIFY CHANGE

As articulated above, those who want to change detention policy bear
the burden of proof. To move from the status quo, they must convince
policymakers with limited attention that existing detention policy is so
suboptimal that a new policy is justified. This is a substantial challenge, not
just because people naturally resist change, or because they prefer the
substance of the status quo, but also because the status quo is
understandable, it is manageable, and many may fear the uncertainty and
unintended consequences of changing the system. 128 To justify change,
advocates must not only make the case to one policymaker or a handful of
policymakers but must change the expectations and collective
understandings of entire policy communities. 129
In this context, it is important to ask who the constituency is for policy
change. In counterterrorism matters, there is an entire cottage industry of
national security and human rights experts whose daily existence is justified
and reinforced by the status quo. For example, a central feature of the work
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the American Civil Liberties Union, 130 Center for Constitutional Rights, 131
Human Rights Watch, 132 Human Rights First, 133 Amnesty International, 134
and dozens of other groups is opposition to current detention policies. But
unlike a traditional lobby, what constituency do these groups represent?
More pointedly, are the mistakes in detention policy important enough for
any individual member of Congress to take steps to change the policy?
Will a member lose their seat over a failure to provide greater due process
protections to detainees? Or is it more likely that they will lose their seat if
they champion the cause of detainees and one of those detainees is released
and kills some of his constituents? That is the political calculus facing
policymakers, and in that calculus it seems difficult to justify changing
detention policy absent some clear benefit to national security. Moreover,
even if individual policymakers agree that the policy should be changed,
they may face substantial hurdles in their attempts to convince
Congressional leaders (who drive the legislative agenda) that the policy
should be overhauled. 135 The power of the status quo is substantial and
perhaps one of its most enduring features is the ability to “kick the can
down the road.” As policy scholars have noted, “[t]he most important
reason for the endurance of the status quo is that power is divided within
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the American system and attention is limited. Because power is
fragmented, many political actors must come together if policy change is to
be made.” 136 If the politics since September 11, 2001 are an indication, the
prospects for groups to come together on counterterrorism policy and
justify change to policymakers are fairly dim.
IV. CONCLUSION
Taken together, the factors discussed above highlight how
counterterrorism detention policy is biased towards the status quo due to an
information-induced equilibrium which has created a context in which the
costs of reform exceed the benefits of the status quo. The status quo is
reinforced by the need to justify changes, the lack of focused attention to
detention policy, and a hyper-politicized policy context in which change
seems impossible.
Both sides in the counterterrorism debate are adequately informed
about the defects in the current system and the ways to remedy those
defects, yet they are unwilling to work for policy reform. The reasons for
this are in part systemic and in part structural. Another reason is that the
power of the status quo when balanced against the uncertainty of change is
a powerful force in policy development. Moreover, the lack of a natural
constituency for policy change means that reform proposals do not have an
advocate willing to make the case to other policy leaders. These defects
should suggest pessimism regarding the prospects for reform of
counterterrorism detention policy.
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